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GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE
EXECUTIVE POWER
JOHN YOO*
A singular factor influenced the ratification of the Constitution's article
on the Presidency: All understood that George Washington would be
elected the first President. It is impossible to understate the standing of the
"Father of his Country" among his fellow Americans. He had established
America's fundamental constitutional principle-civilian control of the
military-before there was even a Constitution. Throughout his command
of the Continental Army, General Washington scrupulously observed
civilian orders and restrained himself when a Congress on the run granted
him dictatorial powers. He had even quelled, by his mere presence, a
potential coup d'6tat by his officers in 1783.' Washington cannot be
quantified as an element of constitutional law, but he was probably more
important than any other factor.
The Revolutionary War had revealed Congress to be feeble, and the
states to be unreliable. Washington had exercised broad executive and
administrative authorities that went well beyond battlefield command to
keep the army supplied. This experience made Washington a firm
nationalist who supported a more effectively organized and vigorous
national government. Though he barely spoke at the Constitutional
Convention, Washington placed his considerable prestige behind the
enterprise. During ratification, he launched a one-man letter-writing
campaign to encourage Federalists throughout the country, and particularly
in his critical home state of Virginia, to win the Constitution's approval.
Washington remains the only President to be elected by a unanimous vote
of the Electoral College.
Because the American Republic grew so successfully, we tend to treat
Washington's decisions with an air of inevitability, but the constitutional
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text left more questions about the executive unanswered than answered.
Article I vested the executive power of the United States in a single
President, but it did not list its components (unlike Article I's enumeration
of legislative powers). It did not create any advisors, heads of departments,
or a cabinet, not to mention a White House staff; specify how the President
should interact with Congress, the courts, or the states; nor describe how the
President and the Senate were to exercise their joint powers over treaties
and appointments.
Washington filled these gaps with a number of foundational
decisions-several on a par with those made during the writing and
ratification of the Constitution itself. His desire to govern by consensus
sometimes led him to seek cooperation with the other branches. He was a
Republican before he was a Federalist, but ultimately Washington favored
an energetic, independent executive, even at the cost of political harmony.
Washington centralized decision making in his office, so that there would
be no confusion about his responsibility and accountability, and his direct
orders sped quickly through the small federal bureaucracy. He took the
initiative in enforcing the law and followed his own interpretation of the
Constitution.
To Washington, the departments and their secretaries served only as
"dependent agencies of the Chief Executive."2 As Leonard White has
written, the President made "all major decisions of administration" and took
full responsibility for them.3 He managed diplomatic relations with other
countries and set the nation's foreign policy. At the end of his two terms,
the Presidency looked much like the one described in The Federalist.
Hamilton's outsized performance as Secretary of the Treasury helped, but
the real credit goes to Washington.4
None of this was foreordained. Washington could have chosen to
mimic a parliamentary system with cabinet secretaries who represented
different factions in the legislature or a balanced government with executive
branch officials drawn from an aristocratic social class. He could have
assumed the function of a head of state and given department secretaries
freedom over their jurisdictions or he could have perceived the Presidency
as Congress's clerk, draining any initiative from the job and committing
himself solely to carrying out legislative directions. He might even have
thought of himself as the servant of the states (he certainly did not; on a trip
to Boston, President Washington refused to call on Governor John
2. MARK J. ROZELL, WILLIAM D. PEDERSON, & FRANK J. WILLIAMS, GEORGE
WASHINGTON AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 58 (2000).
3. LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 27
(1948).
4. PHELPS, supra note 1, at 145-49.
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Hancock, instead forcing an ill Hancock to come to him first).5
Washington ranks in the most recent scholarly poll as our nation's
greatest President. Some might think that his high standing rewards him,
like Jefferson, for his achievements before he assumed office, but this view
understates the second source of his greatness--establishing a stable
government under law that has endured to this day. Washington led the
nation through its first growing pains; restored the country's finances; kept
the nation out of a dangerous European war; opened the West to American
expansion; and saw the Constitution through the appearance of the first
political parties (something the Framers did not foresee and would have
opposed). Washington did all of this without seeking popularity and without
enjoying what we would think of today as political talents. He was a natural
leader, one of the finest horsemen of his age, and a tall and strong man. He
had single-handedly ended a riot among northern and southern soldiers on
Boston Commons by grabbing the leaders in each hand and shaking them
into submission. Washington was stern, distant, and concerned above all
about his reputation. He carried himself with gravitas, projected a
demeanor of republican simplicity and virtue (hence the fable about the
cherry tree), and yet struggled his whole life to control a ferocious temper.
Every President since Washington's day has had the impossible task of
measuring up to his founding example.
I. ESTABLISHING THE PRESIDENCY
After his election in early 1789, Washington took his time getting to the
nation's capital in New York City. He wanted to give Congress time to
count the electoral votes, avoid the appearance of unseemly eagerness, and
allow the people to see the physical symbol of the new national
government. Once installed, Washington made clear who was in charge.
Three approaches to organizing the Executive Branch existed.6 First,
some Senators believed they would share administrative authority because
of their say over appointments and the example set by the state advisory
councils. A second view, identified with Alexander Hamilton, held that
department heads would perform the same positions as ministers in Great
Britain; they would exercise significant independent discretion and
coordinate the making of policy in Congress and its implementation by the
executive. Washington chose a third, which resembled the organization of
his military command. The President alone would exercise the executive
power. He would receive advice from his department secretaries, who
5. The story of the Washington-Hancock tiff is retold in JAMES T. FLEXNER, GEORGE
WASHINGTON AND THE NEW NATION: 1783-1793, at 230 (1970).
6. See FORREST MCDONALD, THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 39-40 (1974).
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would supervise the inferior officers in their agencies. All matters of
executive policy would come to him. He would either make all significant
decisions or delegate them. Administration to Washington, in the words of
historian Forrest McDonald, was "highly personal, after the fashion of the
pre-bureaucratic eighteenth-century world."7
Washington's initiative became apparent within a month of his
inauguration. Even though there were no federal laws to enforce or
positions to fill, Washington quickly took over the existing administrative
machinery of the Articles of Confederation. He ordered the ministers of war
and foreign affairs and the Board of Treasury to provide him with "an
acquaintance with the real situation of the several great Departments, at the
period of my acceding to the administration of the general Government"
and a "full, precise, and distinct general idea of the affairs of the United
States."' He made clear that subordinate Executive Branch officials were
his assistants, rather than independent power centers. Washington wrote
that the "impossibility that one man should be able to perform all the great
business of the State, I take to have been the reason for instituting the great
Departments, and appointing officers therein, to assist the supreme
Magistrate in discharging the duties of his trust."9
Washington could not have accomplished this alone. He had a willing
and able ally in the 38-year-old Congressman from Virginia, James
Madison. Even though Madison had played the leading intellectual role in
the drafting of the Constitution, co-written the newspaper editorials that
would become The Federalist, and led the forces for ratification in the
Virginia convention, he had barely won election to the House due to Patrick
Henry's opposition. Once there, Madison promoted Washington's
policies-a position that would not last into the second term. Madison is
what we would today think of as a coalition builder: organizing behind the
scenes, ceding political credit to others, acting through committees and
larger bodies, yet always moving others toward his preferred goal. What he
lacked in political gifts-he was short, fearfully shy, and weak-voiced-he
more than made up for in his genuine intellect, willingness to work the
longest hours, and meticulous preparation. It is no wonder that he has
always been a favorite of scholars.
Madison took the lead in enacting legislation to establish the
government, from the constitutional amendments that became the Bill of
Rights to the first direct national taxes in American history. Madison
7. Id. at 39.
8. 30 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 344 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939).
9. Id. at 334. For the view that Washington's move to control the machinery of the
Continental Congress is more ambiguous because of the unusual change between forms of
government, see Curtis Bradley & Martin Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign
Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 637-41 (2004).
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likewise managed the debate over the establishment of the first great
executive departments, what Daniel Webster would later call the "Decision
of 1789. '"" The key issue concerned the authority to remove the heads of
the departments of Foreign Affairs, War, and the Treasury. Four
possibilities existed. First, the Constitution may have intended that the
President exercise the power alone, with the Senate's role in confirmation
being the sole exception to his general control over appointments. Second,
it could have reserved the right to the President and Senate together, under
the idea that the same process should be used to reverse a decision as to
make it. Third, removal might only occur through impeachment. Or, fourth,
the Constitution could leave the power to Congress, as part of its power
under the Necessary and Proper Clause to establish the departments in the
first place.
Decision of this question had profound implications for presidential
control of the executive branch. The constitutional text is silent as to
whether cabinet officers must obey presidential orders, and chief executives
to this day back up their commands with the implicit threat of removal. If
cabinet members could only be removed by impeachment, or with the
advice and consent of the Senate, they would feel little fear when ignoring
presidential directives. Congress also recognizes this relationship between
removal and control, and, since the New Deal, has tried to impose
conditions on the removal of officials who work for the independent
agencies. The 1978 Ethics in Government Act, for example, created an
independent prosecutor by prohibiting his or her removal except for
committing a felony or other violation of the law. " Impeachment or
congressional discretion over removal would have created even greater
disruption by transferring effective control over subordinate executive
officials to the legislature. Only an inherent removal power in Article II's
undefined grant of the executive power allowed control of subordinate
officers by the President.
When Congress took up the issue of national finance on May 19, 1789,
Madison proposed the creation of three departments: War, Foreign Affairs,
and the Treasury. Each department would have a Secretary, appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, but removable by
the President alone. 2 Amendments to require Senate approval of removals
failed, and Madison's proposal won a considerable majority. 3 Specific bills
detailing each department's functions came before Congress a month later,
whereupon opponents of executive power again attempted to strike
10. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 151 (1926) (quoting Daniel Webster).
11. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1978.
12. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, at 718-20
(Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 2004).
13. Id. at 738-40.
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recognition of the President's removal authority.
Madison argued that the President's standing as Chief Executive gave
him the inherent power to fire subordinates. "Is the power of displacing an
executive power?" Madison asked the House on June 16. "I conceive that if
any power whatsoever is in its nature executive it is the power of
appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws."' 4 The
Constitution only allowed a single exception to the President's power in the
Senate's advice and consent function. Congress could not add others. "If the
[C]onstitution has invested all executive power in the President," Madison
said, "I venture to assert that the Legislature has no right to diminish or
modify his executive authority."' 5
While there were dissenters, the First Congress clearly believed that
Article II's vesting of the executive power in the President was more than a
stylistic device. Madison's supporters amended the bills to clarify that
Congress was not granting the President the power to remove, but only
recognizing his constitutional authority to do so.' 6 In the Senate, which we
would expect to be more jealous of its prerogatives, the removal provision
encountered more difficulties. The Senate deadlocked 10-10 on the bills to
create the Departments of Foreign Affairs and War because of the removal
question. Vice President Adams broke both ties in favor of the House
versions, handing the administration a victory. The Treasury bill raised a
different variation of the executive power issue. Critics thought the power
of the Department was too great, particularly its authority to "digest and
prepare plans for the improvement and management of the revenue, and the
support of the public credit," which they believed properly rested within
Congress's power of the purse. They sought to divide leadership of the
Treasury into a board, as under the Articles of Confederation, and to limit
the President's removal power because the Department exercised legislative
powers. Again, Madison succeeded in convincing the House to create a
Treasury Department with maximum authority and energy, but within the
President's control, and again the Vice President broke a Senate tie in the
administration's favor.' 7
14. Id. at 868.
15. Id.
16. 1 have been guided through the various debates and changes in the statutory proposals by
Saikrishna B. Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 1029-34
(2006). The debate is also recounted prominently by DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN
CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789-1801, at 36-41 (1997); see also CHARLES C. THACH,
JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775-1789, at 140-65 (1923); and JAMES HART, THE
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY IN ACTION 1789, at 155-89 (1948).
17. Some have argued that Congress's actions indicate that the Treasury Department was not
even an executive department, but rather an administrative agency outside of direct presidential
control. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. I, 28 (1994). Steven Calabresi and Sai Prakash have shown their arguments on
this score to be off the mark. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's
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Members of the legislative and executive branch would recognize that
the "Decision of 1789" represented Congress's own constitutional
understanding of the President's executive authority to remove subordinate
officials. In the course of the debate, supporters of presidential removal
argued that the Chief Executive bore the constitutional obligation to execute
the laws. This required that subordinates aid him "in the administration of
his department."' 8 The President's power to remove gave him the power to
make sure that these officials enforce the laws as he wished. Giving
Congress or the Senate a role in removal would make the President a "mere
vapor" and would place "the Legislature at the head of the Executive
branch."' 9 As Madison wrote to Jefferson, the House vote was "most
consonant to the text of the Constitution, to the policy of mixing the
Legislative and Executive Departments as little as possible, and to the
requisite responsibility and harmony in the Executive Department. '' "0
Washington's cabinet nominations met far less opposition than the
creation of their offices. Hamilton was nominated, confirmed, and took
office as Secretary of the Treasury all on September 11, 1789. Henry Knox
was confirmed as Secretary of War the next day, and Thomas Jefferson was
nominated for Secretary of State two weeks later and was confirmed in a
day. In choosing these officials, Washington did not pursue the same
objectives as Presidents today.
Washington did not become President as the head of a political party
and did not campaign for a "mandate," nor did he seek nominees who
agreed with a particular program or agenda. Washington chose men he
called the "first Characters," who had already held positions of trust in state
government, the Confederation, or the Continental Army. They were to be
both strong on merit and geographically diverse. Washington believed that
selecting nominees who were held in the highest regard in their
communities would encourage respect and "affection" for the new national
government.2 He balanced the major cabinet appointments among Virginia,
New York, and Massachusetts; his Supreme Court nominees hailed from
six different states. His interest in "first Characters" at times outweighed his
interest in harmonious relations: Hamilton and Jefferson quickly became
Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994). Indeed, Madison's arguments in the House
that the Treasury Department ought to be unified under one secretary accountable to the President
defeats their claim. For some interesting applications of this theme to Congress and the federal
courts, see Saikrishna Prakash, Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 VA. L. REv. 1779 (2006). For
the claim that the Decision of 1789 is more ambiguous, see Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 9, at
656-64.
18. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 379 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
19. Id. at 463, 547.
20. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 30, 1789), in 16 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 12, at 890, 893.
21. STANLEY M. ELKINS & ERIC L. MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788-1800, at 53-54 (1993).
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deeply divided over economic and foreign policy, such that Washington did
not even have his cabinet meet as a group until his second term under the
pressures of the French Revolution." Nominees had to be "friends" of the
national government; no Anti-Federalists would assume federal office.
While making his first appointments, Washington wrote that he would not
"bring a man into office . . .whose political tenets are adverse to the
measures which the general government are pursuing." This, he believed,
would be "a sort of political Suicide."23
Given his interest in local reputations, Washington might have
welcomed the Senate's participation before selection of a nominee. Article
II's advice-and-consent structure might have given rise to a joint Senate
role in choosing the nominees-otherwise, what would distinguish "advice"
from "consent"?24 But Washington would have none of it. Even before he
had chosen his cabinet officers, Washington had assumed the responsibility
of nominating customs collectors, who would represent the national
government in every major city and port. For Savannah, Washington chose
a former revolutionary army officer named Benjamin Fishbourne, who was
serving in the same capacity for the state of Georgia. Fishboume became
the first nominee to be rejected by the Senate.
The Senate adopted a resolution seeking face-to-face meetings with the
President for every open office and appointed a committee to meet with
Washington to work out the procedures. Washington promptly nominated
another candidate and rebuffed the idea of formally meeting with the Senate
to choose executive officers. He wanted to make clear that he was the Chief
Executive, and that members of the executive branch were his assistants.
While Presidents, including Washington, have always informally consulted
with members of Congress in selecting federal officers and judges, they
have ever since relegated the Senate's constitutional function to the
approval of their nominees.
Once installed, cabinet members understood that Washington was
responsible for the actions of the entire executive branch. Writing to his
own administration twelve years later, Jefferson described Washington as
sending a stream of questions, requests, and orders to his department
secretaries, and meeting with each of them on a regular basis, usually over
22. FORREST MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 227
(1994).
23. Letter from George Washington to Henry Knox (Sept. 20, 1795), in 34 WRITINGS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 8, at 315.
24. Various Senators and commentators have urged such a role for the Senate over the years.
See, e.g., David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the
Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1502-12 (1992). Arguments against include John 0.
McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process: A Reply to
Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX. L. REV. 633, 638-39 (1993).
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breakfast, to discuss matters until he was fully satisfied.25 This unending
circulation of reports, letters, and paperwork-backed up by the President's
constitutional authority to require "opinions in writing"-kept him "always
in accurate possession of all facts or proceedings in every part of the Union,
and to whatsoever department they related."26 Washington "formed a
central point for the different branches," Jefferson wrote, allowing the
President to promote "unity of object and action among them." Given his
wartime experiences, as Forrest McDonald has observed, Washington felt
little need to delegate foreign or military affairs, sometimes reducing
Jefferson and Knox to the status of glorified clerks.27
Hamilton exercised unusual leadership over the establishment of the
national bank not because of any constitutional or statutory independence,
but because Washington was uninterested in finance. Washington also
trusted Hamilton because of his wartime service as his trusted aide-de-camp
and the recommendation of Robert Morris, who had overseen revolutionary
finances. Hamilton's grand design was unique in another respect. It was the
only time that the administration managed legislation through Congress. In
general, Washington took a hands-off approach to the legislature. In his first
annual address to Congress (delivered in person), he put aside his original
plan to propose legislation and instead spoke generally about commerce,
farming, and manufacturing; promoting science and the arts; and
implementing the Constitution.28 He questioned whether he could do
anything more. "It rests with [Congress] to decide what measures ought
afterwards to be adopted for promoting the success of the great objects,
which I have recommended to their attention."29 Today's practice of
lobbying Congress or threatening a veto to affect policy outcomes would
have been quite foreign to our first President.
Creating the nation's financial system was the exception. Hamilton
proposed that the national government assume the wartime debts owed by
the Confederation and the states. To repay at close to face value, Hamilton
wanted to issue bonds funded by new taxes on imports. His plan essentially
refinanced the national debt by consolidating multiple loans into one large,
regular mortgage payment. Hamilton believed that the creation of a
permanent debt would lead to a stable currency (in the form of government
notes), expand credit within the economy, and give the financial and
merchant classes (who would hold the notes) a stake in the government's
25. See generally WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904).
26. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Heads of Departments (Nov. 6, 1801), in 9 WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 25, at 310-12.
27. MCDONALD, THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 6, at 41.
28. See PHELPS, supra note 1, at 140-41.
29. Letters from George Washington to Baron Poellnitz (Mar. 23, 1790), in 31 WRITINGS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 8, at 23-24.
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success. Hamilton also believed a national bank was necessary to loan the
government money, handle its interest payments, and manage open-market
transactions in government bonds." Assumption of the state debt made it
through the first Congress, but only after Hamilton, Jefferson, and Madison
had reached a deal over dinner. Jefferson supported the financial legislation
when Hamilton agreed that the national capital would rest on the Potomac.3
Hamilton worked tirelessly to build public and congressional support
for his grand design. While the core of Congress's constitutional powers lay
in the purse strings, the complexity of public finance and spending caused
legislators to passively vote up or down on Hamilton's initiatives. Still,
Hamilton's plan caused Washington to consider the first use of the veto.
Madison and Jefferson worried that the proposed system would duplicate
Britain's corrupt political and social system. Influenced by British
oppositionist ideology, they associated a national bank with the Crown's
influence over Parliament, the movement of economic power away from
farms to the cities, and the rise in the political power of the financial
classes. Even as Hamilton's proposal passed both houses overwhelmingly,
Madison attacked it for lacking any specific textual basis in the Constitution
and exceeding the Necessary and Proper Clause.32 Madison reversed his
anonymous position in The Federalist, where he had argued in favor of a
broad reading of the federal government's powers.33
Washington asked Jefferson and Attorney General Edmund Randolph
for their opinions, and even asked Madison to draft a veto message.
Randolph concluded that the Tenth Amendment limited the powers of
Congress to set up a bank. Jefferson argued that the creation of a bank was
not "necessary" to achieve a legitimate purpose, and that to give the
Necessary and Proper Clause a broader construction would burst the
Constitution's careful limits on national power.34 Hamilton responded that
the Clause was a grant of power that allowed the government to enact
means that were not just "necessary," but useful. The Necessary and Proper
Clause empowered the government, rather than limiting it to steps that were
absolutely indispensable.35 Hamilton's opinion would strongly influence the
Supreme Court's holding in McCulloch v. Maryland, which upheld the
constitutionality of the bank twenty years later. 6 Washington signed the bill
two days after he received Hamilton's written opinion.
30. 1 have found invaluable Forrest McDonald's analysis of the Hamiltonian system, and its
political effects, in MCDONALD, THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 6, at
47-88.
31. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 21, at 155-61.
32. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 18.
33. FEDERALIST No. 44, at 302-05 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
34. 19 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 275-80 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1974).
35. 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 63-134 (Harold Syrett ed., 1965).
36. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
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Washington understood the President to have the independent right to
decide on a bill's constitutionality. If he had deferred to Congress, he would
not have asked his cabinet, and he did not think of waiting on the courts to
decide. Washington appears to have believed that he should only veto
legislation he thought clearly violated the Constitution. Jefferson himself
had advised Washington to use the veto only if his mind was "tolerably
clear" on the bill's unconstitutionality. 37
Washington did not issue a veto until 1792 for a bill that allocated
Representatives to different states in a clear violation of the Constitution's
requirement that every state receive no more than one member for every
30,000 citizens.38 While Washington left behind no written thoughts about
the veto, it seems that his reasoning was similar to the logic of Federalist
783' and Marbury v. Madison.4" As the delegation of authority from the
people to their political agents, the Constitution represents the highest law.
No branch of the government can engage in any act that breaches its terms.
A President has a constitutional duty to use his powers, including the veto,
to prevent violations of the Constitution. As Jefferson wrote in his bank
opinion, the veto was "the shield provided by the [C]onstitution" to prevent
Congress from exceeding its enumerated powers.4 '
Washington did not seek to transform his veto into a broader right to
advance his policy views. Glenn Phelps argues that Washington signed
legislation on international trade and senatorial pay that ran strongly against
his own policy preferences.42 Still, Washington did not believe his
legislative function was limited to guarding the Constitution. His only other
veto blocked spending legislation with no constitutional infirmity. In the
last days of his Presidency, Congress passed a bill eliminating two cavalry
units on the western frontier. This clearly rested within Congress's
constitutional authority to raise and fund the military, but Washington
nonetheless rejected the bill because it immediately stopped the pay of
troops far away on the frontier, where they were most needed.a3 Washington
thought Congress's plan made for poor military strategy, something he
knew more about than anyone in the United States.
II. ENFORCING THE LAW
Washington did not believe that his executive power was limited to the
37. 19 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 34, at 280.
38. 32 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 8, at 16-17.
39. FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
40. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
41. 19 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 34, at 280.
42. PHELPS, supra note 1, at 151-52.
43. Id. at 153-54.
No. 1]
12 UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. V
hiring and firing of officials. Procedural in nature, that view places the
President in charge of all of the personnel within the departments and
agencies, but does not recognize any powers of substance. An important
constitutional dimension of the Presidency, however, flows through Article
II's requirement that the President "shall take care that the Laws be
faithfully executed."" While Presidents have believed that the Take Care
Clause includes the interpretation and enforcement of federal law, critics
have argued that it only acts to prohibit the President from suspending a law
duly enacted by Congress.45 Under this theory, Article II's vesting of the
executive power mandates only a single President, and not much else. More
sophisticated scholars, such as Lawrence Lessig and Cass Sunstein,
maintain that Congress's power to establish the agencies includes the right
to decide who is to enforce federal law, even so far as to vest the execution
of law in entities independent of the President.4
This was not Washington's view. He believed that the executive power
held both substantive and procedural dimensions. The President's primary
authorities of substance centered in foreign and military affairs, but a
significant part was domestic. Washington believed that a combination of
his authority as Chief Executive and the Take Care Clause gave him the
power and responsibility to carry out federal law. This included directing
anyone, regardless of his position, who might participate in enforcing the
law. Washington even set precedents followed by no other President after
him in his vigorousness, such as personally leading troops in a show of
force against a rebellion.
Scholars have long observed that the Constitution leaves unclear where
"administration" falls among the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches. For Washington, that function lodged with the Presidency, just as
Hamilton had argued in The Federalist. Our first President believed it
crucial to set a visible precedent of vigorous and effective execution of the
laws to contrast the strength of the new national government with the
weaknesses of the old. Washington's choices were all the more important
because of the First Congress's great mass of legislative activity. Unlike its
predecessor, the First Congress immediately exercised many of its
enumerated powers. It established the executive departments, the federal
courts, tax and customs rules, a system for the sale of the western lands,
intellectual property rights, bankruptcy regulations, and navigation rules.
Some functions were performed by "mongrel" offices (Randolph's
description of the Attorney General because it lacked a department) that fit
44. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
45. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass'n, Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements and the
Separation of Powers Doctrine 5 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/op/signing
statements/aba finalstatementsrecommendation-report 7-24-06.pdf.
46. See generally Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17.
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uneasily in a clean tripartite separation of powers.47 The Post Office seems
to have operated with significant independence; federal prosecutors were
appointed by the courts and reported to the Secretary of State; and the
Secretaries of War and State and the Attorney General reviewed patent
applications.48 But the great mass of federal law was to be carried out by the
new departments, with the Treasury having the greatest number of
employees (500 versus 22 in the other departments) to collect taxes and
customs duties. Washington took control of these officials from the very
start.
As with Shays' Rebellion, Americans' suspicion of taxes put the young
government to the test. One of the subroutines of Hamilton's financial
program imposed an excise tax on the manufacture of liquor. Whiskey was
an important article of commerce, going beyond the impressive drinking
ability of Founding-era Americans. Distilling allowed western farmers to
transform their crops into a more transportable form, to the point where
whiskey even served as a form of frontier currency. After Congress adopted
the tax in 1791, protests occurred in the western parts of Pennsylvania (one
of the leaders was Albert Gallatin, who would become Jefferson's Treasury
Secretary), Virginia, Kentucky, and the Carolinas. Armed resistance broke
out three years later, the first significant internal challenge to the new
federal government. It would not be the last time that Americans would
break the law to defend their beverage of choice.49
Washington employed a strategy of political patience backed up by the
threat of force. When trouble first arose, he issued a proclamation declaring
that resistance to the tax was "subversive of good order, contrary to the duty
that every citizen owes to his country, and to the laws, and of a nature
dangerous to the very being of a government."5 Citing his authority under
the Take Care Clause, Washington ordered all courts and officials to
enforce the tax and to punish lawbreakers. He sent a note to state governors
expressing his "entire confidence" that they would "cheerfully" promote "a
due obedience to the Constitutional Laws of the Union."'" Governors were
not even officers of the federal government, but Washington believed that
47. WHITE, supra note 3, at 164.
48. See Jerry Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations,
1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256 (2006); and WHITE, supra note 3.
49. The discussion of the Whiskey Rebellion is taken from ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra
note 21, at 461-88; MCDONALD, supra note 6, at 145-47; and PHELPS, supra note 1, at 13 1-36. A
sustained scholarly treatment can be found in THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY
REBELLION: FRONTIER EPILOGUE TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1988), and a recent
journalistic retelling in WILLIAM HOGELAND, THE WHISKEY REBELLION: GEORGE WASHINGTON,
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, AND THE FRONTIER REBELS WHO CHALLENGED AMERICA'S
NEWFOUND SOVEREIGNTy (2006).
50. Proclamation of September 15, 1792, in 32 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra
note 8, at 150.
51. Id. at 533.
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he could command them to enforce the law.
Washington then adopted a wait-and-see attitude. Congress amended
the law to moderate, but not eliminate, tax enforcement, and Hamilton
experimented with measures to encourage compliance. Armed resistance
still broke out in the summer of 1794, when tax officers began to issue
arrest warrants in western Pennsylvania, with trials to be held across the
state in distant Philadelphia. About 500 militiamen skirmished with a dozen
regular soldiers and burned the home of the federal tax inspector on July 16.
On August 1, about 7,000 armed men marched on Pittsburgh; federal
officials fled to escape tarring and feathering.
52
Washington believed he had a personal responsibility to enforce the
law. Hamilton, Knox, and Attorney General William Bradford
recommended calling out the state militias under federal control, while
Randolph, now Secretary of State, urged reconciliation through a federal
commission.53 Washington took both courses. The Constitution gives
Congress the authority to provide for the calling of the militia to "execute
the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions. ' '54 Under
the 1792 Militia Act, the President can call out the militia once a federal
judge finds that forces too powerful for the courts are blocking enforcement
of the law.
The administration provided the facts of the rebellion to Justice James
Wilson, who made the required findings. On August 7, Washington issued a
proclamation that the western Pennsylvania area was in a state of
insurrection, ordered the rebels to return to their homes, and declared his
intention to call out the militia. He ordered 12,500 troops from Maryland,
New Jersey, and Virginia in addition to Pennsylvania. Washington also sent
commissioners to offer amnesty to any who would swear an oath to obey
the laws. His strategy was remarkably successful: A large majority took the
oath, while an army of nearly 13,000 (the popular call for troops met with
more volunteers than asked) rode through the area in September. They
found only twenty rebels, the rest having scattered.55
Washington had moved swiftly, issuing his proclamation and calling
out the militia only six days after the attacks on federal officials began. He
had not waited for federal judges to trigger the Militia Act, but instead went
directly to Justice Wilson for a finding of insurrection. He had not consulted
Congress, but instead limited discussion of the options to his cabinet, from
whom he ordered opinions, and to the state governors, who had to supply
the troops. His relationship with the governors is particularly instructive.
Under the Articles of Confederation, the governors and legislatures of the
52. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 21.
53. Id. at 481.
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
55. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 21.
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states routinely ignored requests for legislation or supplies made by the
Continental Congress. Washington turned this unhealthy relationship upside
down. When Pennsylvania's governor claimed that a resort to force was
unjustified, Washington responded that the nation's response would not
depend on the state's views, and ordered him to supply militia to serve
under federal command. Washington believed that when state governors
enforced federal law, they were subordinate to him, even if he could not
remove them.
Washington led the army personally. He rode at the head of the troops,
followed by Hamilton and the governor of Pennsylvania, in a show of the
new government's strength. Washington's actions were remarkably
popular-far beyond anything his cabinet had anticipated-and he followed
them with a message to Congress that described the resistance as an
insurrection, treason, and a challenge to federal authority.16 Congress so
approved of Washington's careful use of his powers that it permanently re-
enacted the Militia Act in 1795 and removed the 1792 Act's requirement
that the President seek judicial approval before calling out the militia-all
that was required now was a presidential proclamation.17
A less dramatic, but equally revealing, episode in the aftermath of the
Whiskey Rebellion further illustrates Washington's control of all aspects of
federal law enforcement. Defending the modem independent counsel law,
today's critics of executive power argue that prosecution does not fall
within presidential control. They have pointed to the fact that in 1789,
Congress created no Justice Department-the Attorney General was the
sole officer whose job was to advise the President and to represent the
United States before the Supreme Court. In the first Judiciary Act, Congress
placed the appointment of federal district attorneys in the courts and did not
make them explicitly responsible to the Attorney General or the President.
Washington did not believe this made federal prosecutors independent.
After the Whiskey Rebellion, he ordered Pennsylvania's federal prosecutor
to drop the cases against two rebels, and after his Neutrality Proclamation
(to be discussed shortly), Washington directed U.S. attorneys to collect
information and prosecute violators. 8 This is not to say that Washington
56. A debate among historians continues to this day about the sources of the Whiskey
Rebellion. McDonald has argued that Hamilton deliberately provoked a confrontation in order to
create the opportunity for a show of force by the federal government. Others have argued that the
sources were primarily economic, in that the tax hit certain classes of western farmers particularly
hard, while recent scholarship argues that the Whiskey Rebellion was the product of a number of
social and political developments in the West that led to an uprising that was more popular in its
roots.
57. See Stephen 1. Vladeck, Note, Emergency Power and the Militia Acts, 114 YALE L.J.
149, 161-63 (2004).
58. 32 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 8, at 455 (Whiskey Rebellion); and
at 386 (Neutrality Proclamation).
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exercised the type of centralized control over prosecution that Presidents do
today. Given the distances of communication and travel, local federal
officials enjoyed a broad discretion that their modem counterparts can onlydream of exercising." Still, Washington believed he could issue direct
orders to anyone who carried out federal law, and none of those on the
receiving end appears to have disagreed.
The handling of the Whiskey Rebellion rebels set another important law
enforcement precedent that counterbalanced the legislature's plenary
control over domestic legislation. Just as the President can direct the
prosecution of cases to the letter of the law, he can also moderate the law's
harshness. Washington's decision to drop the two Whiskey Rebellion cases
made clear that he possessed the discretion to choose which cases to
prosecute and which to let go. The executive branch would not seek to
punish every infraction of federal law. Prosecutorial decisions would be
based on a host of considerations, such as the resources available, deterrent
effect, retribution, and the seriousness of harm. Under President Jefferson,
these considerations would include disagreements with Congress over the
policies and constitutionality of the criminal law. A President could refuse
to prosecute offenders of a law that he believed violated the right to
freedom of speech or religion, even if Congress disagreed.
Washington's offer of amnesty also revealed an important presidential
power-to stay a mechanical application of the law to yield more important
national benefits. The Constitution's grant of the pardon power could have
been read to allow the President only to release individuals already
convicted of a crime, though historical evidence suggests that the Framers
believed it would be used to offer rewards to criminal conspirators who
cooperate with the government.60 Washington used the pardon power for a
broader purpose, that of restoring order and allowing the government to
show magnanimity. Nothing in the Constitution explicitly thrust these goals
on Washington, but as Chief Executive he took the establishment of a
strong government and the protection of the national interest to be his
unique responsibilities. It is a sign of how strongly Washington shaped the
office that even today we automatically assume that Presidents enforce the
laws guided by their own understanding of the public good.
59. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 17, at 659 n. 547; see also Harold J. Krent,
Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275 (1989).
60. See, e.g., David Grady Adler, The President's Pardon Power, in INVENTING THE
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 209 (Thomas E. Cronin ed., 1989).
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III. PROTECTING THE NATION: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
WARS OF EUROPE
Presidents owe their privileged position in foreign affairs not to politics
alone, but to the Constitution and to our first President. Washington
established from the beginning that the executive branch would assume the
leading role in developing and carrying out foreign policy. He did not go
unchallenged. In defending Washington's foreign policy initiatives,
Hamilton first publicly argued that the President is vested with all of the
government's executive power, except that specifically transferred to
another branch by the Constitution. Presidents ever since have taken the
initiative in foreign affairs by relying on their constitutional powers.
The Constitution's text does not explicitly grant much to the President
beyond the undefined executive power, the Commander-in-Chief role, and
the right to receive ambassadors. He must share the treaty and appointment
powers with the Senate, while Congress receives the powers to declare war
and issue letters of marque and reprisal (government permission to
privateers to conduct hostilities against an enemy), to raise and fund the
military, and to regulate foreign commerce, among other powers. There
have been periods where early Presidents deferred to Congress's foreign
policy leadership, though with poor results-witness President Adams and
the 1798 Quasi-War with France, or President Madison and the War of
1812. Indeed, the conventional wisdom among many legal scholars is that
the Constitution gives Congress control over foreign affairs, and that
Presidents have inappropriately seized power over war and peace.61 As a
practical matter, however, the President today can launch the nation into
war without explicit congressional consent, enter or end international
agreements, interpret international rules on behalf of the United States, and
control diplomatic relations with other nations. These decisions, from
President Truman's decision to wage the Korean War to Jimmy Carter's
termination of the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan, have sparked
political controversy and claims of presidential overreaching.
It might not have been Washington's original intention to develop the
executive so completely, because he devoted much of his first term to
establishing the national government, appointing its officers, and fixing the
nation's finances. When he turned to foreign affairs in the early months of
his Presidency, he seemed to think that the Senate would perform the role
of an advisory council on diplomatic matters. In contrast to his approach to
appointments, where he considered the Senate's role to be limited to review
61. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1996);
HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990); MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (1990).
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of his nominations, Washington apparently believed that the Constitution
required him to consult with the Senate before sending ambassadors to
negotiate. As we will see, however, our first President quickly came to the
conclusion that the executive would have to play the primary role in
determining the nation's foreign policy.
A. WAR POWERS
War remains one of the most hotly disputed questions in constitutional
law today. Some claim that the original understanding of the Constitution
requires Congress to authorize all wars because of its power to declare war.
Defenders of the executive branch emphasize the modem practice of
Presidents launching significant wars without congressional authorization.
Opponents of this view have relied on a 1793 statement by George
Washington rejecting a plea that the United States attack the Creek Indians.
"The Constitution vests the power of declaring war with Congress,"
Washington wrote to Governor William Moultrie of South Carolina,
"therefore no offensive expedition of importance can be undertaken until
after they shall have deliberated on the subject, and authorized such a
measure."62 Some scholars claim this shows Washington's agreement that
Congress must enact legislation authorizing all military hostilities abroad.
David Currie, for example, concludes that the "first three presidents,"
Washington included, "took an appropriately narrow view of their authority
as Commander in Chief," a view he believes was faithful to the decisions of
the Constitutional Convention.63
War in the early years of the Republic was not so simple. The
administration sought Congress's cooperation when it needed increases in
the size of the army, military spending, or the approval of agreements-in
other words, those areas where the Constitution specifically provided for a
legislative role. When it came to political and military strategy, however,
Washington and his advisors mostly acted alone. Under our first President,
the United States waged war against only one enemy, the Indian tribes
located in the neighborhood of present-day Ohio. By the time of the
ratification, friction between Indians and American settlers in the West had
grown, and some tribes had refused to respect the terms of the peace with
Great Britain.' British leaders, for their part, hoped that the Indians would
create a buffer state that would limit American expansion in the Northwest.
Washington and Knox pursued a peaceful settlement with the tribes, but
62. Letter from Washington to Moultrie (Aug. 28, 1793), in 33 WRITINGS OF WASHINGTON,
supra note 8, at 73.
63. David Currie, Rumors of War: Presidential and Congressional War Powers, 67 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 2 (2000).
64. See RICHARD H. KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD: THE FEDERALISTS AND THE CREATION OF
THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1783-1802, at 92-93 (1975).
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they prepared for war.
In 1789, it would have been impossible for Washington to conduct
military operations without Congress's active cooperation. This was not
because of the power to declare war; there simply were no troops for the
President to command. After assuming office, Washington reported to
Congress that the existing army numbered only 672 officers and soldiers,
scattered across the frontier. By comparison, Indian tribes menacing
Georgia could field 5,000 warriors for battle.65 Under the Articles of
Confederation, Congress had established a force to protect the frontiers
"from the depredations of the hostile Indians" and police the public lands.66
In order to wage any kind of campaign, Washington would have to
convince Congress to create a standing army. Living in a world with a large
peacetime army and navy, we easily forget that chief executives of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had to seek ad hoc creation of a military
force to fight any significant conflict. Congress's power of the purse and its
authority to establish the military gave it a functional veto over any war and
the ability to limit the nature of a conflict through the structure of the armed
forces.
Congress quickly provided for the continued existence of a small
permanent army. It also gave the President the authority to call out the state
militia "as he may judge necessary" to protect settlers against "the hostile
incursions of the Indians, 67 but enacted no statute declaring war on the
Indian tribes. Aside from the militia authorization, Congress placed no
restrictions of any kind on the use of the regular armed forces. The natural
conclusion is that Congress recognized the President's powers as
Commander-in-Chief to decide how to use the forces once they had been
created. It is possible that Congress believed it was simply re-authorizing
the army under the same conditions and purposes as that of the
Confederation Congress, but we need not depend on inference. During the
House debates, some in Congress objected to the bill's language because
they believed it gave the President the unconstitutional power to start a
war.68 Others wanted to add language to the bill to force a more aggressive
strategy on the administration. Madison argued that Congress should not
specify where troops should be based nor for what purposes they should be
used. "By the Constitution, the President has the power of employing these
troops in the protection of those parts [of the country] which he thinks
requires them most. 69
Washington's actions in 1789 show that he believed that once Congress
65. Id. at 96.
66. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 18, at 715.
67. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, 1 Stat. 95.
68. KOHN, supra note 64, at 97.
69. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 18, at 724.
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created the military, he had the authority to decide whether and how to use
it. Even before Congress had approved the continuation of the regular army,
the administration ordered General Josiah Harmar to begin disrupting
Indian activities in the area of what would become Cincinnati. In October,
Washington ordered Arthur St. Clair, governor of the Northwest Territory,
to mobilize 1,500 militiamen and launch punitive operations against the
Wabash and Illinois Indians, should they reject diplomatic overtures.7v
These troops were not enough. Federalists had long thought that state
militias were unreliable and badly trained and performed poorly. Knox
believed that at least 2,500 regular troops would be needed to quell the
hostile Indian tribes in the Ohio region.7 A few months later, Washington
requested an increase in the permanent army to 1,200, and Congress
obliged. Continuing its practice from 1789, Congress passed neither an
authorization of hostilities nor a restriction on the use of regular troops.72
Washington settled on war with the Indians in the Ohio region that
summer. On June 7, 1790, Washington ordered Harmar and St. Clair to
organize a punitive expedition into Indian territory to destroy bandits who
were harassing settlements and apply pressure for a peace agreement.
Washington soon expanded his aims: to field an army of 2,000 troops-
roughly 1,600 of them militia-to attack the major villages of the Ohio
tribes and to construct a permanent garrison to block their ties to the
British.7 3 As military historian Richard Kohn has written, the "2,000 man,
two-pronged expedition fully committed the military, political, and moral
prestige of the United States government. ' 74 Washington informed
Congress about the scope of the Indian problems to justify increases in the
army and the right to call out the militia, even going so far as to forward
copies of his correspondence with St. Clair.75 But he sought no authority
from Congress for his plan to drive more than 150 miles into enemy
territory.
The offensive met with disaster. In October, Harmar's expedition lost
about 200 men in a battle with the Indians and withdrew back to base,
leaving its dead, wounded, and arms behind. When news arrived in
Philadelphia, disgust reigned. Washington ordered another offensive by a
new army of 3,000 troops with plans to construct a series of forts
throughout the Indian territories. He informed Congress of his intentions in
a December 8, 1790, speech and requested another increase in the size and
70. KOHN, supra note 64, at 98.
71. Id. at 96.
72. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, 1 Stat. 119.
73. KOHN, supra note 64, at 103.
74. Id. at 104.
75. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to House of Representatives (Sept. 16, 1789),
in I ANNALS OF CONG. supra note 18, at 927-28.
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funding of the army.76 Some members of Congress disliked the strategy,
and others opposed the extra spending, but news of Indian massacres on the
frontier overrode any opposition. The second expedition fared even worse:
on November 4, a surprise attack by a force of 1,000 Indians completely
destroyed St. Clair's force. The regular American army ceased to exist, and
the western United States was laid open to attack-it was the most
devastating American military defeat since the early days of the
Revolution.77
When the news arrived in December 1791, the capital was stunned.
Washington came under withering attack, and critics accused the
administration of mismanagement, poor strategy and policy, and a failure of
leadership. Washington and Knox decided to escalate with a large,
professional army that could permanently defeat the tribes. Washington did
not seek statutory authorization for offensive operations or a declaration of
war, nor did he seek congressional ratification of his strategy, but he needed
legislative cooperation to expand the military. Washington sent Congress a
flood of information about the failed St. Clair expedition, conditions in the
Northwest, and a request to quintuple the size of the standing army and
triple military expenditures to roughly $1 million a year. Jeffersonians in
Congress viewed the new military as yet another piece of the Hamiltonian
plan to duplicate the corrupt British political, economic, and military
system. Although opposition was fierce, and public dissatisfaction with the
administration's Indian policy was widespread, Congress gave Washington
what he requested. It placed no limits on the use of the troops but did
include a new restriction-that the troops be demobilized "as soon as the
United States shall be at peace with the Indian tribes."78 Jeffersonians also
included some bitter medicine by conducting an investigation into the St.
Clair disaster and issuing a report attacking the administration for
mismanagement. 79
The 5,000-man army brought victory. Washington ordered General
"Mad Anthony" Wayne to undertake offensive operations against the
Indians (he was even authorized to attack the British forts in the area, if
assured of "complete success"). Diplomatic overtures failed because their
success and British encouragement had convinced the tribes to seek
complete American withdrawal from the Ohio region. Wayne spent all of
1792 and early 1793 assembling and training his army, even as
Jeffersonians in Congress attacked the administration's strategies and
attempted to cut the size of the regular army in half. In August 1794,
76. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1772 (1790).
77. KOHN, supranote64, at 115-17.
78. Protection of The Frontiers of The United States by Raising Additional Troops, 2 Cong.
Ch. 9, 1 Stat. 241 (1792).
79. KOHN, supra note 64, at 116-24.
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Wayne won a decisive victory at the Battle of Fallen Timbers, which
permanently broke Indian military resistance in the area. Historians today
credit the battle with opening up large-scale settlement of the Northwest
Territory and ending British efforts to hem in American expansion. It was a
resounding success for Washington's Indian policy and vindicated his
reliance on a professional military establishment.
Washington's success in the Indian wars did not follow a simple
process of Congress first declaring war, and the executive then
implementing the war policy. Congress never authorized offensive military
operations; at most, it had allowed the President to call out the state militia
to defend settlers from Indian attacks. A more complex process took hold,
one characterized by presidential initiative and leadership, balanced by
congressional control over the size and shape of the military. Washington
and his advisors decided on the mix of negotiations and force, the timing of
offensive attacks, and the overall strategy. Congress respected
Washington's discretion to make these decisions, but it had a functional
veto through its control over the organization and growth of the military. If
it had wanted to favor diplomacy, Congress could have limited the army to
1,000 troops or fewer. Congress's power to control the President's
initiatives came not through formal legislation or declarations, but via its
monopoly over funding.
In most areas of domestic affairs, Washington played a relatively
passive role and left matters to Congress, but not so with military affairs.
From the very first bill continuing the 700-man army through the expansion
to a regular army of 5,000, the Washington administration took the
initiative without fail. Each increase was first developed and then proposed
by the executive branch, and while some in Congress had a different
view-particularly over the balance between regular army and militia
troops-the legislature as a whole never refused the Commander-in-Chief's
requests. In the Republic's earliest years, Washington set an example of
executive leadership upon which future Presidents would draw. At the same
time, Washington took all of the political responsibility for the success or
failure of the Indian wars, and Congress displayed little eagerness to fight
him for it. Blame for the crushing defeat of St. Clair's forces was laid
wholly at the administration's doorstep, but at the same time Congress
deferred to the President's request for more troops to undertake even more
ambitious operations. Presidential power allowed Washington to take the
initiative when the nation's security and interests demanded it, but it also
bore with it the heavy responsibility for failure as well as success.
Some might argue that these military conflicts have little constitutional
significance because they involved the Indians, rather than nations.8" But by
80. See ABRAHAM SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE
George Washington and the Executive Power
all indications, the Washington administration acted as if the normal rules
of war and diplomacy applied. In cabinet meetings on military strategy,
President Washington declared that "we are involved in actual war!"'"
Indians in the Ohio region could field a military force as large as the United
States Army, while the tribes in Georgia had a force five times greater at
their command. When the Washington administration wanted to reach a
negotiated settlement, it considered the agreements to be treaties and
submitted them to the Senate for consent.8 2 Three decades would pass
before the Supreme Court classified the Indian tribes as semi-sovereign,
dependent nations.83 Conflict with the Indians was critical to America's
national security, and the government treated it as the war that it was.
B. CONSENT BUT NOT ADVICE
On Saturday, August 22, 1789, even before Congress had created a
Secretary of State, Washington personally visited the Senate to take its
temperature on a possible Indian treaty. With Knox in tow, the President
came prepared with a short paper on the problem and a list of seven
questions he wanted answered by the Senate. As Vice President Adams
read the questions aloud, street noise from outside disrupted the
proceedings. Adams repeated the questions again. Senators asked that all
relevant treaties and related documents be read aloud, and then asked for
the questions again. Senator William Maclay of Pennsylvania moved that
the whole matter be referred to a special committee. Washington lost his
temper, jumped up, and left the chamber with the words: "this defeats every
purpose of my coming here." Some report that Washington muttered as he
stormed out that "[I] would be damned if [I] ever went there again."84
Apparently, he returned the very next Monday, and the Senate agreed to all
of his questions, but no President, Washington included, ever again
consulted in person with the Senate.
By trying to include the Senate, Washington revealed that it was ill-
designed to play a formal role in treaty negotiations. Because international
politics required secrecy and subtlety, the Senate's formal function in the
future was limited to consent, but not advice. This episode also
demonstrated, as Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick have observed, that the
President was more than simply a prime minister. To be effective, the office
required a certain level of prestige and independence that precluded a
personal appearance before the Senate for permission to conduct
ORIGINS 119 (1976).
81. Errors of Government Towards the Indians (Feb. 1792), in 31 WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON, supra note 8, at 491.
82. See, e.g., Fort Harmar Treaty of 1789, 7 Stat. 28; and Creek Treaty of 1790, 7 Stat. 35.
83. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
84. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 21, at 55-58.
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negotiations. Washington's instinct to take firm control over the nation's
diplomatic relations cemented this institutional dynamic. Upon taking
office, Washington began to issue directions to John Jay, then Foreign
Minister under the Articles of Confederation, and immediately dictated
diplomatic relations with other nations." He assigned ambassadors to their
missions, subject to Senate confirmation, and issued their instructions,
removed them when necessary, and sometimes sent special envoys without
senatorial advice and consent.86 In creating and funding the State
Department, the first Congress recognized the President's special rights in
foreign affairs by not delegating any duties to the Secretary of State other
than those assigned to him by the President. As Sai Prakash and Michael
Ramsey have argued, there would have been no need for the Secretary if the
President did not already have a pre-existing foreign affairs power.87
Congress funded the department simply by appropriating a lump sum and
leaving pay and employee grades to executive discretion.
Washington wanted to protect his authority to set the rank of diplomatic
officials and asked the Secretary of State for his opinion. Jefferson
responded, "The transaction of business with foreign nations is executive
altogether."88 The only exceptions were those functions given to the Senate,
which were "to be construed strictly" in favor of the President's authority.
Which envoys to send, where to send them, their diplomatic grade, and their
instructions, both public and secret, Jefferson concluded, "all this is left to
the President; [the Senate] is only to see that no unfit persons be
employed."8 9 The stuff of ambassadorial rank and negotiating records may
seem trivial today, but in the eighteenth century they were the main
instruments of foreign policy. Nations sent ambassadors on missions to
negotiate agreements with instructions that left them a few goals and great
flexibility on the terms; an ambassador's diplomatic rank signaled his
nation's attitude toward a country. In 1794, Washington sent John Jay, the
former foreign minister and chief justice at the time, to Britain with
instructions to reach the best settlement possible of America's outstanding
differences. His choice sent a strong signal that the United States wanted an
amicable relationship. Echoing Madison's arguments during the removal
debates, Jefferson believed these decisions fell within the President's
authority because foreign affairs remained executive in nature.
Jefferson would regret his support of executive authority as he came to
85. See Saikrishna Prakash & Michael Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs,
111 YALE L.J. 231,299-300 (2001).
86. See SOFAER, supra note 80, at 65-78.
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88. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Powers of the Senate (Apr. 24, 1790), in 5 WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 26, at 161.
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oppose Washington's foreign policies toward France and Great Britain. The
beginning of the French Revolution in 1789 set off wars in Europe that
would last a quarter-century. Eventually, the United States became
entangled and barely escaped with its independence intact. But Washington
kept the United States out of the conflict, giving the nation time to develop
its strength and confidence. In guiding the young republic between the
Scylla and Charybdis of Britain and France, he imposed a policy of
neutrality based on the constitutional understanding that he held the
authority to set foreign policy, interpret and even terminate treaties, and
decide the nation's international obligations. Washington paid a steep price:
his policies divided his government, sparked the creation of the first
political party, and turned future presidential elections into partisan affairs.
Neutrality in the European wars ruined Washington's hopes for a
government ruled by consensus and left him disgusted with politics.
After the beheading of King Louis XVI, France declared war on Great
Britain and Holland on February 1, 1793.90 Edmund Genet, the new
regime's ambassador to the United States, arrived two months later. News
of war threw the American government into a quandary over the 1778
treaties with France, which had been crucial to the success of the
Revolution. Article 11 of the Treaty of Alliance called on the United States
to guarantee French possessions in the Americas, which implied that the
United States might have to defend France's West Indies colony (today's
Haiti).9 Article 17 of the companion commercial treaty gave French
warships and privateers the right to bring captured enemy ships as prizes
into American ports.92 Article 22 prohibited the United States from allowing
France's enemies to equip or launch privateers or sell prizes in American
ports. 93
Genet attempted to rouse the American people against Britain.
Demanding that the United States honor the treaties, he authorized
American ships to raid British shipping. The cabinet split over a response.
Jefferson deeply hated Great Britain, admired the French Revolution, and
suspected Hamilton of duplicating the British political system. For his part,
Hamilton loathed the French Revolution, and his financial system depended
on good relations with Britain. Upon learning of the French declaration of
90. For the relevant historical details, I have relied on ELKINS & McKITRICK, supra note 2 1,
at 303-73; MCDONALD, THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 6, at 113-37;
Editorial Note, Jefferson's Opinion on the Treaties with France, reprinted in 25 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 34, at 597-602; and Letter from Alexander Hamilton to John Jay
(Apr. 9, 1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 35, at 297, 298 n. 4.
These events are also discussed in David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Third
Congress, 1793-1795, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 4-16 (1996).
91. Treaty of Alliance, U.S.-Fr., art. 11, Feb. 6, 1778, 7 Bevans 777.
92. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Fr., art. 17, Feb. 6, 1778, 8 Stat. 12.
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war, Hamilton, "with characteristic boldness," immediately urged
Washington to suspend or terminate the treaties.94 The young Treasury
Secretary simply could not help meddling in the affairs of others, especially
those of the Secretary of State. Hamilton believed that Britain's control of
the seas and its trading system made good relations with London
paramount. While a change in government did not automatically void
treaties with another state, he argued that the uncertain status of the French
government and the dangerous wartime situation allowed suspension of the
treaties.95 While Jefferson agreed that military participation in the European
war was out of the question, he believed the United States was obliged to
fulfill the treaties. (Under the Articles of Confederation, he had served as
minister to France.)
On April 18, Washington sent a list of thirteen questions to Hamilton,
Jefferson, Knox, and Randolph and ordered a cabinet meeting for the next
day-establishing a regular mechanism of presidential decision-making.96
Almost all of Washington's questions involved the interpretation of the
1778 treaties. Question four, for example, asked: "Are the United States
obliged by good faith to consider the Treaties heretofore made with France
as applying to the present situation of the parties?" Washington ordered
them to give an opinion on whether Article 11 applied to an offensive war
launched by France, whether the United States could both observe the
treaties and remain neutral, and under what conditions the United States
could suspend or terminate the treaties.
Washington's questions produced a deceptive unanimity in the cabinet.
Everyone agreed that a proclamation of neutrality should be issued, but in
order to assuage Jefferson's concerns, the word "neutrality" was not used.
Indeed, given the United States' distance, its military weakness, and its
strategic irrelevance to the European theatre, neutrality was the only
realistic option. Two other questions received the same unanimity. The
cabinet agreed that the President should receive Genet as France's
ambassador, making the United States the first nation to recognize the
government of revolutionary France. The members further agreed that
consulting Congress was unnecessary. The executive branch would decide
the nation's position on the European wars. Adjourning the meeting without
reaching the other questions, Washington asked his advisers to submit
written responses on whether to suspend or terminate the 1778 treaties.
No one in the cabinet disputed that the President held this power under
94. Notes on Washington's Questions on Neutrality and the Alliance with France (May 6,
1793), in 25 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 34, at 665-66.
95. See Letter from Hamilton to Jay (Apr. 9, 1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, supra note 35, at 297-98.
96. See Letter from Washington to Hamilton, Jefferson, Knox, and Randolph (Apr. 18,
1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 35, at 326-27.
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the Constitution. On April 28, Jefferson, later joined by Randolph, argued
that international law did not permit the suspension or annulling of a treaty
because of a change in government.97 Because he believed that France was
unlikely to ask the United States to defend the West Indies, Jefferson
recommended that the administration do nothing. On May 2, Hamilton and
Knox argued that the civil war in France allowed the United States to
suspend the treaty, or even terminate it because of the new circumstances
threatening American national security.98 They read the treaty to apply only
to defensive wars, not to one in which France had attacked first. Telling
Jefferson that he "never had a doubt about the validity of the treaty,"
Washington decided against suspension the next day.99 On the question of
the West Indies, Washington decided to remain silent, a wise choice, as
Jefferson's prediction proved correct and France did not seek American aid.
Washington issued his decision in a proclamation drafted by
Randolph.'0 0 Recognizing a state of war between France and the other
European powers, he announced that the United States "should with
sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial
toward the belligerant [sic] Powers." Washington further saw fit to "declare
the disposition of the United States to observe the conduct aforesaid
towards those Powers respectfully" and "to exhort and warn the citizens of
the United States carefully to avoid all acts and proceedings whatsoever,
which may in any manner tend to contravene such disposition." The
proclamation also stated that the federal government would prosecute those
who "violate the law of nations, with respect to the Powers at war." His
proclamation was a determination that American obligations did not require
entry into the war on the side of the French. After a year, Congress
implemented his interpretation into domestic law by making it a crime for a
citizen to violate American neutrality.'0 '
Although the Continental Congress had negotiated and ratified the 1778
treaties, Washington never asked about its intentions.0 2 None of his cabinet
members wanted to interpret the treaties in the light most favorable to
France. Both Hamilton and Jefferson grounded their appeals in the national
interest, international law, and common sense. Neither expressed a belief
97. Opinion on the Treaties with France (Apr. 28, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 34, at 608-18.
98. Letter from Hamilton & Knox to Washington (May 2, 1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 35, at 367-96.
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100. 1 COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: 1789 1897, 156
(James D. Richardson ed., 1900).
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that consultation with Congress or the Senate was necessary or advisable.
Washington and his cabinet proceeded on the assumption that it was the
province of the executive branch to interpret treaties, and so set foreign
policy, on behalf of the United States. They even believed that the President
had the authority to terminate the 1778 treaties. Hamilton argued that the
President could terminate if necessary, but recommended only suspension.
Fighting a rearguard action, Jefferson did not raise a constitutional
objection. Even though Hamilton convinced Washington to declare
neutrality, it is doubtful that Jefferson could have produced any other
outcome-the United States simply was not going to enter the war on
France's side, at least not for another two decades.'0 3
The proclamation provoked one of the great constitutional debates in
American history. In a series of newspaper articles that summer, Hamilton
adopted the pseudonym of "Pacificus" to defend the President's
constitutional authority.0 4 Hamilton began with the position that foreign
policy was executive by its very nature. Congress was not the "organ of
intercourse" with foreign nations, while the judiciary could only "decide
litigations in particular cases." Declaring neutrality, therefore, must "of
necessity belong to the Executive." It drew from the executive's authority
as "the organ of intercourse between the Nation and foreign Nations," as
"interpreter of the National Treaties in those cases in which the Judiciary is
not competent," and as enforcer of the law, "of which treaties form a part."
Hamilton argued that treaties, as well as the rules of international law, were
part of the laws to be carried out by the executive, and "[h]e who is to
execute the laws must first judge for himself of their meaning." Last, but
not least, Hamilton believed the executive could declare neutrality because
of its "Power which is charged with the command and application of the
Public Force."
Basing his claims on the constitutional text, Hamilton argued that the
President's authority derived from Article II, Section 2's grant of the
executive power. The Constitution already made the President Commander-
in-Chief, maker of treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate,
receiver of ambassadors, and executor of the laws. But "it would not consist
with rules of sound construction to consider this enumeration of particular
authorities as derogating from the more comprehensive grant contained in
the general clause." Article II's enumeration of powers "ought . . . to be
considered as intended . . . to specify and regulate the principal articles
implied in the definition of Executive Power; leaving the rest to flow from
the general grant of that power . . . ." For Hamilton, the Senate's role in
making treaties was only a narrow exception from the general grant of
103. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 85, at 325-27.
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executive power to the President and "ought to be construed strictly." When
the Constitution sought to transfer traditionally executive powers away
from the President, it did so specifically, as with the power to declare war.
"The general doctrine then of our constitution is, that the Executive Power
of the Nation is vested in the President," Hamilton concluded, "subject only
to the exceptions and qualifications which are expressed in that instrument."
Madison, however, expressed surprise and concern over the President's
Proclamation of Neutrality. In a letter to Jefferson, Madison claimed
Hamilton had talked Washington into an "assumption of prerogatives not
clearly found in the Constitution and having the appearance of being copied
from a Monarchical model."10 5 His immediate criticism was that the
proclamation intruded on Congress's power to declare war. Jefferson
explained that although he had agreed in the cabinet that the President could
declare neutrality without consulting Congress, he nonetheless had
constitutional concerns. When Hamilton's Pacificus essays--defending the
President's power to declare neutrality-appeared in the press, Jefferson
begged Madison: "For God's sake, my dear Sir, take up your pen, select the
most striking heresies and cut him to pieces in the face of the public."10 6
Under the pseudonym "Helvidius," Madison took issue with every
point of Hamilton's constitutional arguments.0 7 He dismissed Locke's and
Montesquieu's classification of foreign affairs as executive in nature
because they were "evidently warped by a regard to the particular
government of England." Making treaties and declaring war were
legislative powers because they had the force of law; therefore, the
President could not exercise them. "The natural province of the executive
magistrate is to execute laws, as that of the legislature is to make laws,"
Madison wrote. "All his acts therefore, properly executive, must presuppose
the existence of the laws to be executed." The Constitution vested the
power to declare war in Congress and gave the Senate an equal share in the
treaty power, confirming that they set private rules of conduct made the law
of the land by the Supremacy Clause. To allow the President a share of the
legislative power "is an absurdity-in practice a tyranny."' 8
Madison's deeper argument was that placing the power to start and
wage war in the same hands risked tyranny. "Those who are to conduct a
war cannot in the nature of things be proper or safe judges whether a war
105. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (June 13, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 34, at 272-74; see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
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ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded."' 9 Why? Because,
according to Madison, "war is in fact the true nurse of executive
aggrandizement.""' In war, "physical force is to be created," "the public
treasures are to be unlocked," "the honors and emoluments of office are to
be multiplied," and "laurels are to be gathered," and all are to be placed at
the disposal of the executive. It is an "axiom," therefore, that "the executive
is the department of power most distinguished by its propensity to war."
Pacificus' broad reading of the vesting of the executive power in the
President, Madison retorted, was nothing less than an effort to smuggle the
British Crown into the Constitution.
History has looked more favorably on Hamilton's arguments than
Madison's. Helvidius claimed rather unpersuasively that foreign affairs
were legislative in nature or shared between the branches, and he never
directly addressed Hamilton's argument about Article II's vesting of the
executive power in the President."' It was difficult for Madison to deny that
Article 1I granted the President some unenumerated powers, in light of his
arguments during the removal debate. Madison ultimately rested on the
narrower point that the President could not interpret treaties in a manner
that prevented Congress from exercising its own plenary constitutional
power to declare war."2 The Proclamation, however, did not prevent
Congress from declaring war, if it wished. Washington's actions only had
the effect of preserving the status quo.
Despite the partisan divisions, the Helvidius-Pacificus debates and the
neutrality controversy demonstrate some common ground. No one doubted
that the President held the initiative in foreign policy, nor did Madison take
serious issue with the idea that the executive had the power to interpret or
even terminate treaties. Madison and Jefferson were making a broader
argument against unenumerated executive powers and the structural point
that those powers could not be used to supplant Congress's own authorities.
Hamilton agreed with this up to a point, noting that Congress's power to
declare war gave it the final word on whether the United States was in a
state of war with another country. The Constitution's explicit grant of a
specific power to Congress prevents the President from usurping that
power, just as Congress cannot use its own plenary powers to invade the
proper scope of the executive's powers. We can see this balance in
Washington's unsuccessful efforts to prosecute individuals for violating the
109. Id.
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proclamation. Only Congress could regulate the conduct of citizens within
the United States, and it was not until Congress enacted criminal legislation
that prosecutions could succeed." 3
The proclamation set one of the most important precedents for
executive power: Presidents henceforth would exercise the initiative in
foreign affairs. Jefferson and Madison wanted to limit the executive's
powers where they were perhaps needed most-in foreign affairs. But the
growth of the nation and its interests would place increasing pressure on
their constitutional vision. As the effect of foreign affairs on the nation
grew, the powers of the office would respond to keep pace. Still,
Hamilton's view required no prerogative, no ability of the President to act
outside of the Constitution when necessity demands. He believed that the
Constitution gave the President, through the grant of "the executive power"
of the government, all of the authority necessary to handle exigencies and
unforeseen circumstances. Jefferson and Madison, on the other hand, fought
against an elastic reading of presidential power, and, as Jefferson's opinion
on the bank showed, generally in favor of a strictly limited federal
government. This would force them, surprisingly, into the position of
relying on the theory of an extra-constitutional presidential prerogative
when they assumed power in 1800.
C. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
Washington's largely successful efforts to keep the United States out of
the European wars called on him to define executive power one last time in
his last year in office. The occasion was the Jay Treaty, which sought to
resolve long-term issues plaguing Anglo-American relations. Great Britain
continued to occupy forts within the Northwest Territory, which under the
1783 peace treaty it was required to evacuate, on the ground that British
creditors could not recover pre-revolutionary loans made to Americans.
British officials in the area caused constant trouble by encouraging local
Indians to oust the Americans from the territory. A more immediate
difficulty was Britain's naval war against France. American merchants and
shippers were profiting handsomely by selling to both belligerents, with the
trade between the Caribbean colonies of the two great powers being
especially lucrative. In 1793, Britain declared an embargo against France,
seized neutral ships carrying contraband including food, and captured
113. The Washington administration attempted to prosecute violators of neutrality in the
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sailors on American ships who were allegedly British deserters. Later that
year, Britain imposed a blockade on the French West Indies trade, leading
to the immediate seizure of 250 American merchant ships in the area.' 14
Britain's seizures of American shipping stoked a war scare. Congress
rejected proposals for a 15,000-man army but agreed to a temporary
embargo on Great Britain and the construction of six daring new frigates,
America's first blue-water navy. After news came that Britain had
rescinded its embargo of the French West Indies, Washington sent Chief
Justice Jay to London as a special envoy to settle all outstanding disputes.
Jay reached an agreement in November 1794, which arrived in the United
States in March. In Jay's Treaty, Britain agreed to evacuate the
northwestern forts, allow limited American trade with the West Indies,
grant most-favored-nation tariff treatment to American imports, and create
an international commission (the first of its kind) to arbitrate the debt
claims, the seizures of American ships, and the U.S.-Canada border. Jay
failed to reach any settlement on slaves carried off by British forces at the
end of the Revolution or to secure British commitment to the principle that
neutral ships could carry goods to any of the belligerents. Under the
circumstances, it was probably the best deal possible: It ended the British
threat to the western territories and kept the peace for another seventeen
years. Many historians today consider the Jay Treaty a success and another
example of Washington's leadership. 15
Opposition by Jefferson's supporters was so fierce that it cemented the
emergence of the two-party system in American politics. In June 1795, a
20-10 Federalist majority in the Senate barely approved the treaty (except
for the provision on the West Indies trade, which it rejected). Washington
ratified the treaty in August. When the text became public, large protests
erupted throughout the country. Jeffersonians sought to capitalize by
blocking measures in the House needed to implement the treaty, such as
changes in tariff schedules and appropriations for the compensation of
British claims. Hoping to reveal embarrassing details within the
administration, the House voted 62-37 in March 1796 to request all of the
papers related to Jay's mission. On earlier occasions, the administration had
supplied papers in response to congressional investigations, one into St.
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Clair's defeat by the Indians and the second into allegations of financial
irregularities by Hamilton. Although he cooperated with Congress on these
occasions, Washington had taken the view that he could refuse if the
disclosure of the information would harm the public interest." 6 Even if the
Presidency could lay claim to a right of executive privilege, the benefits of
maintaining harmony with the legislature and public confidence in
government would usually prevail.
This time, Washington chose to place the confidentiality of executive
deliberation above good relations with Congress. Only five days after the
House sent its request, Washington responded that it had no constitutional
right at stake. To allow the House to see the papers would create "a
dangerous precedent.""' 7 The Constitution had vested the power to make
treaties in the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, because
of the need for secrecy in diplomatic relations. Expanding the House's role
would undermine the nation's ability to keep secrets and make it difficult, if
not impossible, to manage foreign affairs effectively.
Washington observed that the Framers had explicitly rejected any role
for the House in treaty-making, and had included the Senate to protect state
interests-a fact he knew well as President of the Constitutional
Convention. The House had an obligation to implement the treaty, as it had
already carried into effect without question all previous ones. If the House
had a legitimate constitutional claim to the papers, Washington might
comply, but here he need not consider it. "It does not occur that the
inspection of the papers asked for can be relative to any purpose under the
cognizance of the House of Representatives," Washington wrote, "except
that of an impeachment which the resolution has not expressed." ''
Jeffersonians were shocked, Federalists overjoyed. Efforts to block the
treaty soon lost steam, in part because of Washington, in greater part
because the restoration of the international carrying trade sparked an
economic boom.
Debate has continued to this day over whether Washington correctly
refused the House's demand for information. He did not describe his
nondisclosure as "executive privilege" or ground it in a broad theory of the
President's right to protect internal communications and advice, as the
Supreme Court would in the Watergate tapes case.' 19 Washington kept his
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claim carefully circumscribed to the House's exclusion from treaty-making.
He had turned over all of the papers to the Senate as part of the process of
advice and consent. Washington, however, clearly believed that his right to
withhold information from Congress extended beyond that narrow context.
In 1794, the Senate requested all diplomatic communications between the
American envoy to France (who was then Gouverneur Morris) and the
Secretary of State. Attorney General William Bradford advised that the
President could withhold correspondence whose revelation would harm the
public interest, and the other members of the cabinet agreed. Washington
provided the correspondence but informed the Senate that he had not given
them material that, in his judgment, ought not to be publicly
communicated. 20
Washington's arguments have broad implications. He consciously
ignored the House's legitimate constitutional right to gather information to
appropriate money and regulate trade.' 2' To say that the House had a right
to the documents only if it were considering impeachment was an
overstatement, to say the least. Washington based his refusal in part on the
need for secrecy in foreign affairs, referring to the harm that would result if
the government could not act with discretion in negotiating agreements.
While limited to treaties, Washington's decision would provide the
foundations for future Presidents to expand their right to keep from
Congress and the courts any information the disclosure of which would
harm the national interest.
CONCLUSIONS
Our Constitution usually grants those elected to the Presidency their
legitimacy; with Washington, it was the reverse. His standing as the Father
of the Country bestowed legitimacy on the Constitution. It is hard to
imagine another member of the founding generation who could guarantee
that the Constitution would overcome the centrifugal forces of its early
years. Washington placed at the service of the young government his record
as the general who had won the nation's independence, and his reputation
for republican virtue etched in memory when he had stepped down from
command.
Washington was not the greatest simply because he was the first. He
did more than serve as the ceremonial head of government. Understanding
instinctively that his actions set the example for his successors, Washington
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made decisions that fulfilled the Federalists' hope for independence and
energy. He reserved to the executive control over the selection of
government nominees; treated all subordinates as part of a unitary executive
branch, with himself at the top; and fought to keep the internal deliberations
of his advisers confidential.
Washington believed he had to interpret the Constitution independently
in executing his powers, whether by signing proposed bills or implementing
those on the books. When it came time to enforce national laws and
policies, Washington led the troops personally to demonstrate the energy
and authority of the new government. In foreign affairs, Washington read
the Constitution to give him the executive's traditional leading role,
including the interpretation of treaties and international law, the deployment
of military force, and the conduct of diplomatic relations. He moved
forcefully to keep the nation out of the European wars and to reach a
settlement with Great Britain.
Washington demonstrated that a President could not succeed without
his constitutional powers. The Framers did not account for, and were openly
hostile to, political parties. They believed that a President should stand
above parties, which were seen as temporary factions assembling against
the national interest.12  From the very beginning, Washington saw his office
as advancing a set of policies, a program which required the cooperation of
the executive and legislative branches. Washington's administration
devised the national banking system and the assumption of debts. It
developed the policy of neutrality in the wars between Great Britain and
France and set the nation on a hostile military course with the Indians.
Washington understood the Presidency as giving him, not Congress, the
initiative in defining foreign and domestic security policy.
Institutional independence included recognition of the other branches'
prerogatives. Only the legislature could create the bank, approve the Jay
Treaty, or fund the troops on the frontier. While Washington was dismayed
at the open partisanship of the Jeffersonian opposition, his administration
began the first experiments in the coordination of executive and legislative
branches through a common political party. Washington would even
recognize perhaps the ultimate limitation on the Presidency. By stepping
down after two terms, Washington introduced a republican rotation in
office, a precedent unbroken until Franklin D. Roosevelt, which proved to
be a political bulwark against executive tyranny. By combining
constitutional independence with constitutional self-control, Washington set
the example of a republican executive that his successors would follow.
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